# Risk Disclosure

## Known Risk Categories

| Risk Type                  | Description                                                                  | Mitigation Measures                                                        |
| -------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Valuation Risk**         | Outdated or conflicting NAV input data                                       | Multi-source verification, audit cycle constraints, outlier exclusion      |
| **Liquidity Risk**         | Redemption surges exceeding budgeted capacity                                | Layered liquidity, two-channel redemptions with approval, quota management |
| **Market Manipulation**    | PP pool depth may be insufficient, making prices susceptible to manipulation | TWAP sampling, buffer trigger, NAV disregarding short-term prices          |
| **Governance Attacks**     | Vote-buying leading to poor-quality assets being listed                      | Layered governance, hard thresholds non-voting coverage, timelock          |
| **Smart Contract Risks**   | Code vulnerabilities leading to fund losses                                  | Multi-round audits, bug bounties, phased rollout                           |
| **Underlying Asset Risks** | RWA/Private Equity/Fund Credit/Market Risk                                   | Launchpad hard thresholds, continuous disclosure, diversified allocation   |

## Contingency Planning for Extreme Scenarios

### Scenario: Mass Redemption Wave

1. **Emergency quota depletion** → T+0 redemptions rejected until quota refreshed
2. **Standard quota exhausted** → New T+7 redemptions rejected until quota refreshed
3. **Large redemptions** → Require keeper approval before processing
4. **Quota status disclosed** → Market-driven pricing of premiums/discounts
5. **Risk control intervention** → Keepers evaluate whether to refresh quotas or pause

### Scenario: Significant NAV Decline

1. **Underlying asset impairment** → NAV downward adjustment via AssetController
2. **PP market price may react prematurely** → Discount widens
3. **Keeper intervention** → May reduce quotas or pause redemptions (Protection Band automation planned for Phase 2)
4. **Ongoing disclosure** → Market receives updated information
5. **Asset disposal completed** → NAV stabilizes → Quotas restored → Normal operations resume

## Emergency Reserve Fund

| Parameters              | Configuration                                                |
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Funding Sources         | Agreement fee deductions + Initial reserves                  |
| Target Size             | 3-5% of Prime TVL                                            |
| Trigger Conditions      | Weekly NAV decline >10% or liquidity event                   |
| Authorization Usage     | Risk Control Multi-Signature (3/5)                           |
| Disclosure Requirements | Weekly public disclosure of balances and transaction records |

## Risk Control Flow

```
Normal Operations
       │
       ▼
┌──────────────────┐
│ Monitor Metrics  │
│ - NAV deviation  │
│ - Liquidity usage│
│ - Queue depth    │
└────────┬─────────┘
         │
    ┌────┴────┐
    │ Alert?  │
    └────┬────┘
         │
    Yes  │  No
    ┌────┴────┬────────┐
    ▼         ▼        │
┌────────┐ Continue    │
│ Assess │ Normal      │
│ Level  │             │
└───┬────┘             │
    │                  │
┌───┴───┬──────┐      │
▼       ▼      ▼      │
Low   Medium  High    │
│       │      │      │
▼       ▼      ▼      │
Warning Partial Full  │
Only    Pause  Pause  │
        │      │      │
        ▼      ▼      │
      Review Emergency │
      Metrics Response │
        │      │      │
        └──────┴──────┘
               │
               ▼
         Resolution
               │
               ▼
         Return to
         Normal ────────┘
```

### Risk Level Trigger Thresholds

| Level      | Deviation (D\_t) | Quota Utilization | Pending Approvals | Response                             |
| ---------- | ---------------- | ----------------- | ----------------- | ------------------------------------ |
| **Normal** | < 8%             | < 70%             | < 10 requests     | Continue operations                  |
| **Low**    | 8-12%            | 70-85%            | 10-20 requests    | Warning issued, increased monitoring |
| **Medium** | 12-15%           | 85-95%            | 20-50 requests    | Keeper review, may reduce quotas     |
| **High**   | > 15%            | > 95%             | > 50 requests     | Emergency review, quotas paused      |

### Response Timeline

| Phase          | Duration | Actions                                        |
| -------------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
| **Detection**  | 0-1h     | Automated alerts, initial assessment           |
| **Immediate**  | 1-24h    | Risk committee review, protective measures     |
| **Short-term** | 1-7d     | Root cause analysis, stakeholder communication |
| **Recovery**   | 7-30d    | Remediation, gradual return to normal          |

## Valuation Risk Deep Dive

### NAV Data Sources

| Source Type       | Update Frequency | Weight            |
| ----------------- | ---------------- | ----------------- |
| External Audit    | Quarterly        | High              |
| Custodian Report  | Monthly          | Medium            |
| Issuer Disclosure | Weekly minimum   | Medium            |
| On-chain Oracle   | Real-time        | Low (signal only) |

### Conflict Resolution

When sources disagree:

1. Flag the conflict publicly
2. Use most conservative value
3. Escalate to risk committee
4. Publish resolution rationale

## Liquidity Risk Deep Dive

### Quota Stress Testing

| Scenario        | Emergency Quota | Standard Quota  | Keeper Action                      |
| --------------- | --------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| Normal          | <50% utilized   | <50% utilized   | Routine refresh                    |
| Moderate Stress | 50-80% utilized | 50-70% utilized | Increased monitoring               |
| Severe Stress   | >80% utilized   | >70% utilized   | Reduced refresh, stricter approval |
| Crisis          | Depleted        | >90% utilized   | Pause new redemptions              |

### Recovery Timeline

| Phase       | Duration | Actions                                               |
| ----------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------- |
| Immediate   | 0-24h    | Pause emergency redemptions, assess situation         |
| Short-term  | 1-7d     | Process pending T+7 redemptions, communicate clearly  |
| Medium-term | 1-4w     | Asset liquidation if needed                           |
| Recovery    | 4-12w    | Gradually restore quotas, return to normal operations |

## Governance Attack Vectors

### Known Attack Types

| Attack                | Description                                | Mitigation                               |
| --------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------- |
| Vote Buying           | Purchasing votes to pass harmful proposals | Timelock, hard threshold protection      |
| Flash Loan Governance | Borrow tokens, vote, return                | Snapshot-based voting, lock requirements |
| Sybil Attack          | Many fake accounts                         | Minimum stake requirements               |
| Collusion             | Coordinated voting by insiders             | Transparent voting, community monitoring |

### Protected Parameters

These parameters **cannot** be changed by governance voting alone:

* Launchpad hard thresholds (custody, audit, disclosure)
* Protection band emergency triggers
* Supply cap (10B PAIMON)
* Core safety mechanisms

## Smart Contract Security

### Audit Status

All core contracts will undergo comprehensive security audits before mainnet deployment. The audit process includes:

1. **Pre-audit**: Internal code review and testing
2. **Primary audit**: Engagement with a reputable security firm
3. **Remediation**: Address all identified issues
4. **Re-audit**: Verification of fixes
5. **Public disclosure**: Full audit reports published

Audit reports will be made publicly available upon completion. Subscribe to our official channels ([X](https://x.com/Paimon_Finance), [Telegram](https://t.me/paimon_rwa)) for audit announcements.

### Bug Bounty Program

| Severity | Reward Range |
| -------- | ------------ |
| Critical | $50K - $500K |
| High     | $10K - $50K  |
| Medium   | $2K - $10K   |
| Low      | $500 - $2K   |

## Pre-IPO SPV Risks (xSPCX / pSPCX)

In addition to the Prime Vault risks above, holders of pre-IPO SPV tokens should understand:

| Risk                            | Description                                                                                                                                                                                  | Mitigation                                                                                           |
| ------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Single-issuer concentration** | xSPCX value tracks one underlying SPV (today: SpaceX). Idiosyncratic events at the issuer fully reflect into the token                                                                       | Diversify across products / venues; do not size positions assuming PP-style portfolio cushion        |
| **SPV-administrator solvency**  | The off-chain SPV is a separate legal entity; insolvency or fraud at the SPV administrator can impair the underlying claim                                                                   | Operational due diligence on SPV partners; documented in drop metadata                               |
| **Private-market valuation**    | The underlying private equity has no daily mark-to-market; large bid-ask spreads may emerge                                                                                                  | Treat reported NAVs as point estimates, not closing prices                                           |
| **KYC-asymmetric exit**         | Non-KYC holders can transfer xSPCX freely but **cannot redeem to pSPCX**. If primary settlement against the SPV becomes the only liquidity venue, non-KYC holders rely on KYC counterparties | Plan exit through xSPCX secondary trading; do not assume primary redemption is available without KYC |
| **Bridge invariant**            | `totalSupply(xSPCX) = locked(pSPCX) × ratio` is enforced in `TokenBridge`, but a UUPS upgrade error or compromised admin key could in principle break the peg                                | Multi-sig + timelock on UPGRADER\_ROLE; on-chain invariant check verifiable by anyone                |
| **EIP-3643 agent powers**       | `AGENT_ROLE` on pSPCX can `freeze`, `forcedTransfer`, `pause`. Used for compliance enforcement but represents centralization                                                                 | Multisig agent + event emission; agent actions auditable                                             |
| **Regulatory change**           | Securities-law treatment of the SPV interest depends on jurisdiction; future changes can affect transferability or holder rights                                                             | Geographic disclosure; KYC onboarding restricted to permitted jurisdictions                          |

## User Responsibility

Users should understand:

1. **PP is not a stablecoin** — NAV fluctuates with underlying assets
2. **Instant liquidity is not guaranteed** — Redemptions are subject to quota availability and approval thresholds
3. **Large redemptions require approval** — Amounts exceeding thresholds (50K standard, 30K emergency) need keeper approval
4. **xSPCX and pSPCX are not equivalent in legal rights** — xSPCX is a tradable mirror; only pSPCX holders have direct settlement rights against the SPV. Conversion requires KYC
5. **KYC onboarding is currently institutional-only** — retail wallets should treat xSPCX as their endpoint
6. **Smart contract risk exists** — despite audits, bugs are possible


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